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Abstract 
Pragmatism is not a doctrine: it is a method that makes our own ideas clear. Yet, the object of any 
idea is not properly an ‘object’ in the traditional sense. The object of any conception is something 
related to a power, a capacity, a preparedness to act and produce effects. The definition of meaning 
is not – particularly in Peirce’s thinking - something well-profiled, a clear-edged form which is 
precisely and perfectly said. It is rather designed by the unlimited tension of its capacity to generate 
consequences, or – to put it in synechistic terms – by the continuous, growing and unpredictable 
development of “would-bes” and “would-acts.” 
Thus, the definition of an idea, or a belief, cannot be a precise response to the question: “What is 
it?” – rather, it is the answer to the question “What could it do?”. It doesn’t address an indicative 
form, but a conditional power.  
My thesis is that this view marks a profound revolution in our tradition of thought, a revolution 
that in modern times has been prepared by Spinoza (who interpreted in his Ethics the essence of 
any being not as pure form, but as power and potentia agendi). Peirce showed, especially from 
1890 on, to know very well Spinoza’s thought. We have a remarkable review for The nation (1904) 
in which he related Spinoza to pragmatism, because for him “the substance of what one believes 
does not consist in any mere sensuous representation, but in how one would be disposed to 
behave.” 
Through Emerson’s mediation (a Spinozian-Schellinghian thinker, incredibly influential in the 
Cambridge atmosphere), through his re-definition of the notion of ‘power’ and ‘endeavor,’ this 
Spinozian-Emersonian tradition acted like a virus: hidden in the folds of Peirce’s reflections, it 
permanently affected their marrow. 
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It is not always easy to explain what it means to think in a pragmatist way. Is it simply a way 
of looking at practical, everyday life matters from a philosophical standpoint? Is it a way of 
thinking that belongs to a precise theoric movement, as lofty and profound as, for example, the 
phenomenological or neo-positivistic ones? What distinguishes the pragmatist way of 
philosophizing? James addresses this question by clarifying that pragmatism is not a doctrine, but 
an attitude, a tendency to reason in a certain way. Peirce characterizes it as a method to make our 
ideas clear and produce stable beliefs. According to pragmatists, the meaning of any conception 
should not be treated as an abstract notion. It should be based on the differences it would produce 
in our practice, were we to believe it to be true – whence the tendency to emphasize the value not 
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of causes or principles, but of effects and results, and to regard ideas less as universals of reason 
than as plans for action.  
Some scholars have linked this tendency to the influence of English empiricism. Yet, 
pragmatism also owes something to the Nicomachean Ethics, to a naturalistic version of Hegelism, 
and to the great influence of Kantism, especially on Peirce – not to mention Evolutionism. In my 
view, though, one cannot entirely explain the underlying idea of pragmatism by reference to these 
influences alone. It is something more than, and utterly original compared to, these well-
established traditions. Peirce himself outlines a different genealogy:  
I may mention, for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental 
biographies, that I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord — I mean 
in Cambridge — at the time when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were 
disseminating the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from 
Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous 
mysticism of the East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic 
against Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted 
any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, some 
benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, and that now, after long 
incubation, it comes to the surface, modified by mathematical conceptions and by 
training in physical investigations. (W8: 135, The Law of Mind.)2 
I will try to take Peirce’s transcendentalist and Schellingian genealogy seriously. While I 
follow a specific historiographical path, I shall also proceed in light of a more general theory of 
hermeneutical inspiration. Let us bear in mind what Peirce had already expressed in 1868, in a 
seemingly marginal note of Some Consequences of Four Incapacities: “Accordingly, just as we 
say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought 
and not that thoughts are in us” (W2:227n4.) In what kind of common thought do we – who call 
ourselves pragmatists – find ourselves, in what current do we “swim,” to borrow a word from 
Peirce’s theory of synechism? Whence does the idea originate according to which meanings are to 
be clarified by what they enable us to do? 
To answer this question and present my hypothesis as precisely as possible, I will begin by 
recalling a particular event from Peirce’s life. Ralph Waldo Emerson held a series of lectures at 
Harvard College, Cambridge, in 1870-71.3 These served as the basis for one of his last 
contributions, “The Natural History of Intellect”. The young Peirce was one of the seven invited 
lecturers and followed Emerson’s lectures with great interest. Emerson was a mature man; he had 
already written both Essays and The Conduct of Life; by all accounts, he had a tremendous appeal 
on those who attended his lectures. Peirce was very impressed by “The Natural History”. One 
could say he was truly infected by the ideas which Emerson disseminated as ‘germs’ in the 
Bostonian atmosphere – metaphysical, speculative and, at the same time, genuinely naturalistic 
and proto-pragmatist ideas. Certainly, Peirce harmonized them with different interests of his: logic, 
mathematics, the theory of inquiry and the study of categories. But Emerson’s ideas never faded 
away from Peirce’s search. To the contrary, they developed into its cornerstone, as I will show in 
a moment.4  
Let me make another introductory remark. Peirce articulated a conceptual architecture which 
is unparalleled in the contemporary world. His philosophical method is not designed as a purely 
formal one, but precisely as a meth-odos – a way (odos, in Greek) – leading to ethical and 
metaphysical objectives through the tools of the logic of research. As is known to anyone who has 
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ever approached Peirce’s work, in his system tout se tiens: Peirce’s theory of categories is a 
framework for understanding both cosmology and the logic of relatives; semiotics is not only 
linguistic theory but also a key to interpret, for example, theology; metaphysics is supported by a 
pragmatic vision; mathematics comprises questions of generality and vagueness; logic aims at a 
complete regeneration of the traditional way of reasoning and must result in a diagrammatic project 
of new scripture, and so on and so forth. But if it is true that, in Peirce, everything is held together, 
this happens by virtue of a specific element: as he himself points out, synechism – in its close 
relation to fallibilism, realism and infinite semiosis – is “the master key which adepts tell us 
unlocks the arcana of philosophy” (CP 1.163.) Those who focus their attention only on one aspect 
of Peirce’s thought do not and cannot comprehend it; his aim was unequivocally to express the 
growth of concrete reasonableness in different fields, a principle that is metaphysical as well as 
empiricist and pragmatist. 
Synechism represents the law of continuity connecting everything that is present in the 
universe, be it ideal or real (including the very distinction between ideal and real). It implies the 
absence of any division or break between one entity and another, and the impossibility of 
accurately evaluating the individuality of things. “For where there is continuity the exact 
ascertainment of real quantities is too obviously impossible” (CP 1.172.) There cannot be 
autonomous parts, “unrelated chunks of being” (EP2: 2); we must avoid reasoning by referring to 
pure substances, res; we should rather proceed by focusing our attention on the merging of parts 
into each other. First of all, therefore, there can be no dualism between mind and matter, thought 
and reality, man and the world. 
But this Spinozian-Schellingian principle should be read from an evolutionary and pragmatist 
perspective. We need to reach the idea that everything endlessly develops and improves its results. 
No result is stationary (CP 1.614), and this leads to think: 
The essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely 
perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth. It is like the 
character of a man which consists in the ideas that he will conceive and in the 
efforts that he will make, and which only develops as the occasion actually arise. 
Yet in all his life long no son of Adam has ever fully manifested what there was in 
him. So then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the occurrence of 
more individual events than ever can occur. (CP 1.615, emphasis added.)5 
Peirce here very clearly shows what he means by “the development of concrete reasonableness.”6 
What he means leads directly to my argument: if it is true that being is continuously “in the 
making”, that any possible definition of a human being, or entity, changes along the way, we can 
say that Peirce does not think of essence as static, formal and substantial, but views it as a power 
of development and a train of conceivable actions. Reason and Being are in a state of incipiency, 
of growth, as we have read (the influence of Darwinian evolutionism is evident here.7) But this 
means that being is to be defined by its consequences and, in the case of man, also by the efforts 
he puts into effect to achieve his objectives. Yet, “no agglomerations of actual happenings can ever 
completely fill up the meaning of a ‘would be’” (EP2:402). Continuity is “something whose 
possibilities of determination no multitude of individuals can exhaust” (CP 6.170).  
In this way, Peirce marks the extreme originality of his pragmatist thinking and its radical 
difference from any other twentieth-century tradition. Pragmatism is an attitude to understand each 
being in light of the question “What can it do?” – not “What is it?”. Take Peirce’s example of the 
diamond (used from 1878, cf. W1:132, to 1905, EP2:356): if subjected to pressure, every diamond 
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resists, thereby manifesting its power (not essence or form) to be hard, its power to resist in all 
possible circumstances – predictably, but also absolutely unpredictably. And no definition of a 
diamond could be more precise. 
At the same time, we must dismiss the idea that the occult state of things (be it a 
relation among atoms or something else), which constitutes the reality of a 
diamond’s hardness can possibly consist in anything but in the truth of a general 
conditional proposition. For to what else does the entire teaching of chemistry relate 
except to the “behavior” of different possible kinds of material substance? And in 
what does that behavior consist except that if a substance of a certain kind should 
be exposed to an agency of a certain kind, a certain kind of sensible 
result would ensue, according to our experiences hitherto. As for the pragmaticist, 
it is precisely his position that nothing else than this can be so much as meant by 
saying that an object possesses a character. He is therefore obliged to subscribe to 
the doctrine of a real Modality, including real Necessity and real Possibility. 
(EP2:357, Issues of Pragmaticism, 1906) 
The most perfect definition of the meaning of a word (for example, the word “hard”) is the 
description of the habits it leads us to adopt and the effects it is capable of producing. But such a 
description will never be complete. It is simply the indication of a power: a “preparedness to act” 
(cf. EP2:399.)8 Its repeated confirmation will always be conditional upon the realization of further 
states and events. 
The method to “make our ideas clear”, therefore, does not lead to the outlining of clear-cut and 
well-defined meanings, established once and for all. A clear idea is not the substantial eidos of 
Aristotle, nor a concept which analytically falls within the order of a dictionary (Eco 1984: 84-5); 
rather, it is something that takes shape by reference to practical examples that might derive from 
its use in broad semiotic contexts. Peirce develops his argument on the basis of the notions of 
power, disposition, and resolution to act: something which, by definition, knows no perimeters, 
boundaries or fixed limits, but which is rather defined by the unlimited tension of its capacity to 
produce effects, or – to put it in synechistic terms – by the continuous, growing and unpredictable 
development of “would-be” and “would-act” (EP2: 402). 
In the light of this, I believe that Peirce’s real teacher is precisely Emerson. It can be easily 
demonstrated that, in Emerson, the notion of power is quite fundamental (a fact Nietzsche had 
grasped very well9). One of the most important essays in The Conduct of Life (Emerson 1904: 
Vol.VI, Ch.II) is entitled “Power.”10 Life “is a search after power” (II:1), we read at the beginning 
of the essay, and its forms and manners are but modes of power. The real question is thus” Not 
what, but how” (“Behavior”, Vol. VI, Ch.V: 1): “The power of manners is incessant” (ibid.), “and 
every gesture and action shall indicate power at rest.” (ibid, V:34) However, in Emerson’s work 
the reference to vital power is inextricably linked to an acknowledgement of the force exerted by 
the laws of Nature, which are our own laws (see “Nature”). Likewise, as we have seen, for Peirce 
pragmatism and synechism go hand in hand: to see the core of each concept in the productive 
power of the inexhaustible series of sensible effects deriving from its comprehension is to envisage 
a continuity between mind and matter, between the intellectual and the sensible. 
All power is of one kind, a sharing of the nature of the world. The mind that is 
parallel with the laws of nature will be in the current of events, and strong with their 
strength. One man is made of the same stuff of which events are made; it is 
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sympathy with the course of things; can predict it. (Emerson 1904; Vol. VI, Ch.II: 
5, “Power”) 
It is Emerson’s insistence on the notion of self-reliance, a guiding idea of his research, that shows 
how fundamental to his thought the idea of power really is. As Cornel West points out (West 1989), 
this idea lies at the origin of the ‘anthropological mythology’ of the American man, the man 
resistant to adversity, connected to the beautiful nature around him, ready to conquer the border, 
but also ideally to overcome any inner border; the ideal of becoming what you think you deserve 
to be, so as to rightfully boast about your rights. But, upon a closer reading of Emerson’s work, it 
is clear that self-reliance is nothing but confidence in the simultaneity between the expression of 
one’s thoughts and the forces of nature, the awareness of being perfect at every moment of every 
event, the strength to understand that good and evil are only forms in which one expresses 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction at one’s own power to act (cf. Emerson 1904: Vol.2, Essays, 1st 
Series. Ch.II: “Self-Reliance”), the law of one’s own nature. This is anything but individualism; 
rather, it is a form of naturalism that boils down to a Spinozian resolution: man is not a special 
domain within nature, and nothing in it gives him reason for self-commiseration (see Ethics, Part 
III, “Preface”) – “to the poet, to the philosopher, to the saint, all things are friendly and sacred, all 
events profitable, all days holy, all men divine” (Emerson 1904: Vol.2, Ch. 1:12, “History”).  
This affirmative and synechistic vision is based on the equivalence between nature and power: 
“the genius of man is a continuation of the power that made him” (Emerson 1904: Vol. XII: 
Ch.1:99, “The Natural History of Intellect”). “An individual mind is a fixation or momentary eddy 
in which certain services and powers are taken up and minister in petty niches and localities, and 
then, being released, return to the unbounded soul of the world” (ibid.:65). Man-world continuity 
expresses itself in constant acts of power: “Each man is a new power in Nature” (ibid.: 67). “a 
constructive power” (109). And again, “Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit” 
(Emerson 1904: Vol.2, Ch.X:29, Essays 1st Series. “Circles”). Step by step we scale his mysterious 
ladder; “the steps are actions, the new prospect is power”. (ibid.:7). The character itself is read as 
power, that must characterize the good social structure, too (“the energetic class.”)11 
But normally – writes Dilworth (Dilworth 2010: 40,) discussing some of these passages – we 
are alienated from ourselves, not trusting the unknown powers of our own thought. Self-reliance 
means trusting this very power and derive joy and happiness from that. The strength of 
perseverance converges with that of power: “There is but one liberator in this life from the demons 
that invade us, and that is Endeavour – earnest, entire, perennial endeavour” (Emerson 1904: Vol. 
XII, Ch.2: 27, “The Natural History of Intellect: Instinct and Inspiration”, and see the remarks in 
Dilworth 2010: 41.) How can we not think here of the Spinozian conatus? Emerson rarely mentions 
Spinoza.12 But let us not forget that Spinoza had long been banned from the academic and scientific 
arena; he was, after all, the heretical philosopher par excellence. Although immensely influential 
for Goethe, Schelling and most Romantics (all pivotal authors for Emerson), his name created a 
sort of embarrassment in religiously inspired circles. 
Yet, I would like to show how the ideas just outlined, which point to some of the principal 
themes in Emersonian philosophical thought, are of fully Spinozian inspiration. 
I will not base my remarks on the first two books of Spinoza’s Ethics – where the metaphysics 
of substance, attributes and modes are traced – but on the third and fourth books. These are the 
parts Gilles Deleuze has brought back to contemporary attention, basing his interpretation 
specifically on the notion of power.13 Let us briefly recall a few points that may be helpful to 
clarify my argument. God, the sole Substance or Nature, expresses himself in infinite ways thanks 
to his infinite power to act. The power of God, therefore, his potentia agendi, wholly marks his 
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substantiality (his “active essence”, writes Spinoza in Ethics I, P34.) Spinoza offers us the idea of 
an operational deity, always at work, active and efficient, expressing an event by each of his 
actions, without ever ceasing to produce pragmatically relevant, “useful” effects (not merely 
“good” effects, but rather ones that are good because they are useful.)14 Every reality proves perfect 
as it is, since it is nothing but a way in which God presents himself (herein lies the all too apparent 
heresy: God is in every piece of mud, misery, and human filth – nothing needs to be redeemed. 
Peirce notices this in one of his reviews for The Nation.)15 The idea of a unique and yet infinitely 
dynamic and multifarious substance reverberates in Spinoza’s negation of the two Cartesian res. 
Thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same: Peirce’s synechistic principle 
and the idea expressed by Emerson in “Nature” or in “Oversoul” are, in my view, heirs to this 
radically anti-dualist and anti-Cartesian assumption, which no other modern author supports so 
forcefully. 
If we are to understand how to “conduct our lives” (to borrow the words of the suitable title of 
Emerson’s volume), Spinoza tells us, we must follow the ontological path of the first two parts. 
Our conduct of life must be an exercise in the observation of things sub specie aeternitatis: we 
must learn to understand that there are no separations, distinctions, precise edges between events, 
but that they all are made up of the same stuff. We must understand that man is nature and nature 
is infinite things, expressions of divine power; that mind and body, thought and extension, do not 
belong to opposite domains, but are identical, though perceived according to different attributes 
(Ethics II, P7). Such an understanding leads to satisfaction and joy, to acquiescence (an important 
Spinozian and Emersonian term), the achievement of which is the sole purpose of human life.16  
In the third part, Spinoza develops his anthropology by wisely analyzing human affections. He 
begins by articulating an idea that, coming from Emerson, will sound familiar to us: everything, 
as it is, endeavors to persevere in its being (III, P7). This endeavor, this effort, this desire or 
appetite, this force or drive (translations vary – pragmatically we could add: this habit17) is called 
conatus by Spinoza. Man does not control it, but it is a clear expression of human power, that is 
of his essence.  
The endeavour (conatus) by which each thing endeavours to persevere in its being 
is nothing other than the actual – that is the essence of the thing. Demonstration: So 
the power, i.e., the endeavour of each thing by which, either alone or with others, it 
either acts or endeavours to act […] is nothing other than the given, i.e., the actual 
essence of the thing” (my emphasis. Ethics, III, P7.) 
If man (like every ‘mode’ of Nature) is characterized by his power to act (potentia agendi), in so 
far as he has the power to do certain things, then his good and virtue can only be measured against 
what fulfills this power. The conatus is the first and only foundation of virtue (Ethics IV, P22C.) 
Ultimately, being virtuous means bringing out one’s own talent and capacities. To this we should 
add that the power in question is an expression, or part, of the power of God, which is to say of 
Nature (for there is no essential difference between the Substance and its modes.)18 Spinoza’s 
Ethics is an ethics of power, of the disposition to act, of the tendency to produce effects and to 
balance the power of affections. As Deleuze writes, this is no abstruse metaphysics, but a practical 
philosophy (Deleuze 1981.) The true essence of man – writes Spinoza in Ethics IV, D8 – lies in 
the strength of this potentia agendi, in so far as “he has the power of doing certain things which 
can be understood through the laws of his nature alone”. Thus, “By virtue and power I understand 
the same” (IV, D8.) 
7 
 
In other words, we cannot define and understand man on the basis of what he is, but only on 
the basis of what he can and cannot do. What matters is how far his efforts, desires, affections, and 
capacity of producing new effects can go. The conatus is an infinite cupiditas or endeavor, whose 
directions we cannot predict a priori. It is not an indicative form, but a conditional power. The 
work of knowledge is to think what increases the power to act of both mind and body. 
Like Peirce, Spinoza tells us that well-being is not a state of empty bliss, but the satisfaction 
that comes from witnessing the growth of concrete reasonableness (CP 1.614, 5.3.) The sage will 
therefore always be more powerful than the ignorant. Through reason he will be freer and will 
overcome any form of slavery. Moreover, according to Spinoza, the only human virtue, the only 
ethics that can be recommended, consists in knowing how to express this conatus satisfactorily – 
or, in Deleuze’s words, how to learn not to be alienated by our power. 
It follows that we can read Spinoza’s ethics as an ethics of power, an ethical exercise 
concerning our dispositions to act. The word capacity or attitude (aptitudo) is recurrent: for 
example, in Part II, P13Sc and V, P39. The power expressed by the body in its practices and 
affections corresponds to the mind’s power to perceive and understand things. The potentia agendi 
becomes potentia intelligendi in IV, P26Dem:19 “Since this endeavour of the mind by which the 
mind, in so far as it reasons, endeavors to preserve its being is simply understanding, this endeavors 
to understand is the primary and sole basis of virtue.” This makes it sufficiently clear in my opinion 
that for Spinoza acting and reasoning are one and the same. Knowledge is the highest, most joyful 
and most successful form of conatus: an intelligendi conatus. Is this a pragmatist ethics, then? We 
shall establish this shortly, but we might start by observing that pragmatism, conversely, could be 
read as a philosophy of power, in the two senses of the word (expressed by the Greek word 
dynamis): potentiality, attitude, disposition, and ability on the one hand; power, force, and energy 
on the other.20 
Allow me, in closing, to offer a historical note on Peirce and Spinoza. I hope to have made it 
clear that, thanks to the mediation of Emerson (especially the Schellingian Emerson), there are 
indeed many theoretical links between their views. What Emerson and Peirce share, and what 
brings these two authors close to Spinoza’s panentheism, is not just a synechistic perspective, but 
an emphasis on the power to act and to produce effects. This may be regarded as the most original 
element distinguishing these different philosophical traditions. 
I have also tried to show that the Spinoza’s and Peirce’s insistence on the potentia agendi and 
intelligendi is quite revolutionary in the classical philosophical context. Now, one could object 
that Peirce makes only a handful of references to this tradition in his work. Yet, the relevance of 
the passages I shall quote unequivocally reveals the importance of Spinoza in Peirce’s thought, at 
least from 1890 and up to his latest re-examinations of pragmatism.21 Indeed, this Spinozian-
Emersonian tradition acted like a virus: hidden in the folds of Peirce’s reflections, it permanently 
affected their marrow.22 
Let me direct your attention to some of Peirce’s reviews of volumes (published in The 
Nationover several years) related to the thought of the seventeenth-century philosopher. The short 
texts are incredibly effective. They document, once again, the stature of a man who had a vast 
historical, philosophical, scientific, and truly encyclopedic knowledge – above all, a philosopher 
who thoroughly knew what he was interested in and how to turn this into a living thought, in tune 
with his general vision of the world. 
The first text is the most extraordinary for me; it comes from a review of a new edition of 
Spinoza’s Ethics (edited by W. Hale Wright, Macmillan 1894; Peirce 1894.) Peirce begins by 
saying that, of course, Spinoza is abstruse; perhaps he did not fully understand the strength of his 
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own thought (but then again none of the great philosophers understand themselves), and his 
geometric apparatus was only “a veil over the living thought”, a communicatively useful fiction. 
However, as if thinking of his own philosophical style, often accused of being disorganized and 
obscure, Peirce adds:  
Crystal clearness, such as we justly require in mathematics, in law, in economics, 
is in philosophy the characteristic of the second-rates. The reason is that the 
strongest men are able to seize an all-important conception long before the progress 
of analysis has rendered it possible to free it from obscurities and difficulties.23 
Notice the Spinozian distinction between clear and distinct knowledge on the one hand, and vision 
on the other. Some philosophers, then, have the gift of being able to see and grasp on the fly what 
is ultimately relevant, before being able to formulate their thoughts as analytical arguments.  
In a different review of 1902, manifesting his full appreciation of the Spinozian text, Peirce 
adds: “his philosophy was deep, out of the common way of thinking” (review of A Study of the 
Ethics of Spinoza by Harold Joachim, Peirce 1902.) Often we do not understand it because we read 
it with Cartesian eyes, but Spinoza is valuable precisely for his radical anti-Cartesianism. 
Curiously, in a subsequent review (Spinoza’s Political and Ethical Philosophy by R. Duff; Peirce 
1904,) Peirce refers to a Spinozian infection that contaminated Herder, Mendelssohn, Goethe and 
Schiller – an infection we can trace back to Boehm and forward to Hegel – thus echoing the virus 
he himself mentions in The Law of Mind. 
Finally, the crucial passage: 
The commentators have been apt to restrict their studies too much to the one book 
that is so formal, that they consider Spinoza too exclusively as a metaphysician, 
and that they have not paid enough attention to his extraordinary approaches toward 
pragmatism (Peirce 1904.)  
Peirce explains that all this had already been quite clear to him even before reading Duff’s text, 
which had simply helped confirm his opinion. In the same review, we further read: “Mr. Duff 
makes no reference to pragmatism [...] but Spinoza considered philosophy from an intensely 
practical point of view.” If he had lived until the age in which men commonly reach philosophical 
maturity, he might very likely have “conferred upon philosophy the inestimable advantage of a 
formulation that vindicates so many judges of common sense and anthropomorphism” (Peirce 
1904.)  
Consequently, ethics is to be understood as a practical science. Spinoza’s aim was not to 
engage in abstract speculation, but to show human beings how they could lead better lives. To do 
so, he needed to set out from a metaphysical ontology, yet his goal was an ethical – or, better still, 
pragmatic – one. Spinoza has taught us that “the substance of what one believes does not consist 
in any mere sensuous representation, but in how one would be disposed to behave” (ibid., my 
emphasis.)24  
After reading these remarkable passages, it is not surprising to find the name of Spinoza in the 
Collected Papers and related manuscripts, whenever Peirce draws a possible genealogy of 
pragmatism.25 This is the case, for example, in a 1905 letter to Calderoni (CP 8.206): “Of those 
who have used this way of thinking [pragmaticism] Berkeley is the clearest example, though Locke 
(especially in the fourth book of his Essay), Spinoza, and Kant may be claimed as adherents of 
it.”26 Spinoza is quoted again, in an analogous way, in A Neglected Argument, Additament, 1910 
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(CP 6.490): “But although it is ‘an old way of thinking,’ in the sense that it was practiced by 
Spinoza, Berkeley, and Kant, I am not aware of its having been definitely formulated, whether as 
a maxim of logical analysis or otherwise, by anybody before my publication of it in 1878.” 
There is no doubt, it seems to me, that Peirce regarded Spinoza as someone who was able to 
appreciate the value of pragmatist principles even in Cartesian and mechanistic times. This is 
extraordinary if we consider how little of Spinoza’s thought was circulating in Peirce’s milieu. 
But, all historical comparisons aside, this conclusion also reveals what Peirce regarded as the 
correct way of interpreting his pragmatism, namely, as a tendency to articulate the meaning or 
essence of every entity in light of its power, its capacity to produce new effects and generate habits. 
It is in such terms that Peirce reformulates the pragmatic maxim in the last stage of his career:27 
“Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings – especially in modifying 
habits or as implying capacities – you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then, your 
(interpretational) conception of those effects is the whole (meaning of) your conception of the 
object” (my emphasis, R 322, 1907.) If meaning lies in conceivable practical effects, it is formed 
entirely by modifying one’s habits; hence, it lies in capacities and powers that must find expression 
in action and can never be exactly defined once for all. 
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1 The original, and briefer, version of this paper was delivered in New York, at the Meeting of the 
Charles Sanders Peirce Society, January 2019. 
2 On the Schelling-Emerson-Peirce link, see Kruse 2010, who presents especially the Peircean 
formulation “Matter is effete mind” as being purely Schellingian. I would add purely Emersionan, 
too (see Emerson 1904: “The Natural History of Intellect”, Vol. XII:40: “Matter is dead mind.”). 
She quotes a passage from a ms that reads as follows: “My philosophy is Schellingism transformed 
in the light of modern physics” (Kruse: 2010: 398n3). See also Kaag 2013: 194: “Emerson serves 
as the intellectual bridge between Peirce and Schelling”, and Guardiano 2016 and 2017. 
3 For more references see Dilworth 2010, Kaag 2013, Kovailanen and Anderson 2014, and 
Guardiano 2017. This last article and Kaag 2013 note that Peirce lectured on “British Logicians” 
in 1869-70, Emerson on “The Law of Mind” in 1870 and on “The Natural History of Intellect” in 
1870-71 (Emerson 1904, XII). Peirce’s 1892 The Law of Mind, then, was clearly inspired by 
Emerson. In a manuscript quoted in Kovailanen and Anderson 2014, he writes: “I frankly pigeon-
hole myself as a modified Schellingian, or new England transcendentalist.” (R 958) 
4 Guardiano 2017 speaks of “Peirce’s New England Neighbors”, referring to a sort of proximity 
that brought Peirce close to Emerson and to his other Bostonian-Concordian fellows, and which 
endured over the years. In this context Peirce’s thought flourished. Guardiano (2017:218) writes 
that in that neighborhood there was “a synechistic influence of an intellectual culture pervading 
and broadly affecting the people.” These ideas, then, form a sort of continuum of feelings, a 
“substantial community of transcendentalist grounding” that we can retrace in many Peirce’s 
thoughts. In this article I will argue that the wind of Spinoza blew through the neighborhood of the 
Concord community, enveloping the Schellingian Emerson and the synechistic Peirce. 
5 Kaag 2013:199 quotes a beautiful passage from Emerson’s “Law of Mind”: “A man never gets 
acquainted with himself but is always a surprise and a problem.” 
6 In the Preface to Vol.5 of the CP, the editors report this passage from the 1902 Baldwin Dictionary 
entry “Pragmatic and Pragmatism”: “Nevertheless, the maxim has approved itself to the writer, 
after many years of trial, as of great utility in leading to a relatively high grade of clearness of 
thought. He would venture to suggest that it should always be put into practice with conscientious 
thoroughness, but that, when that has been done, and not before, a still higher grade of clearness 
of thought can be attained by remembering that the only ultimate good which the practical facts to 
which it directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness; 
so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual reactions at all, but in the manner 
in which those reactions contribute to that development.” (CP 5.3.) 
7 This appears to be an epigenetic perspective: see Fabbrichesi 2011. In this essay I discuss 
Chauncey Wright, too. His research has to be borne in mind, since it was so important for Darwin 
himself. “New uses of some old powers” was his motto, a motto that S.J. Gould has recently 
rediscovered. 
8 In his crucial introduction to his Pragmatism (EP2: 399,) Peirce refers to Bain’s definition of 
belief: “that upon which a man is prepared to act.” 
9 See Zavatta 2006. 
10 This essay is preceded by another fundamental one: “Fate”. In the spirit of both Spinoza and 
Nietzsche, Fate and Power must be considered together. Power is precisely that which leads us, 
not to oppose fate, but to say ‘yes’ to it. True freedom is what allows one to accept the 
“circumstance”; conversely, freedom of the will reflects unavoidable circumstantial necessity 
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(Emerson 1904: Vol. VI, Ch.1). We would have to add that in Peirce tychism does not permit a 
severe form of necessitarianism. Yet, the similarities between Spinoza, Emerson and Peirce seem 
to me stronger than the differences. 
11 See James, The Energies of Man, for a long-standing tradition in this spirit (James 1907.)  
12 There are, though, more than few references in the Emersonian essays, especially in Nature, 
Intellect, Quotation and Originality, Character, Plutarch, Inspiration. 
13 Gilles Deleuze actually based his reading of Spinoza on this. See Deleuze 1968, 1981, and, only 
in Italian, Deleuze 2007. On the link between Deleuze and pragmatism, via Spinoza, see 
Fabbrichesi 2019. On Deleuze and Pragmatism, in general, see Bowden S., Bignall S. and Patton 
P. 2015. 
14 On these issues, see Gueroult 1930, Negri 1991, and Deleuze 1968. In “The Natural History of 
Intellect” (Vol.XII, Ch.1:66) Emerson writes: “It is only the source that we can see – the eternal 
mind, careless of its channels, omnipotent in itself, and continually ejaculating its torrent into every 
artery and vein and veinlet of humanity. Wherever there is health, that is, consent to the cause and 
constitution of the universe, there is perception and power.” This seems consistent with Peirce’s 
formulation of continuity, defined as “something whose possibilities of determination no multitude 
of individuals can exhaust.” (CP 6.170)  
15 Review of Harold H. Joachim’s A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, “The Nation” 75 (10 July 
1902.) 
16 As regards purpose, an important word in Peirce’s vocabulary, we should bear in mind that in 
What Pragmatism is (1905) Peirce distinguishes himself from James and the other pragmatists by 
defining his theory as expressing relation to some definite human purpose. “Now quite the most 
striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational 
cognition and rational purpose” (CP 5.412.) 
17 This power resembles a habit, as Laurent Bove shows in his introduction to the Tractatus 
Politicus (2002), by referring to definition XXXII of the Affections (Ethics, Part 3), in which the 
dispositio is properly assimilated to the conatus (“dispositio seu conatus”, a disposition, i.e. 
endeavor). This passage is illuminating from a pragmatist perspective. In Spinoza, Bove writes, 
“It is the habit that ensures the continuity of our being. This habit, founding in the living present 
of its contractions a remembered past and an expected future, establishes time as the very substance 
of our existence [...] The habit in act explains the existence of all things: it is the figure of the 
perseverance of being, our habit of living” (Bove 1996:56.) 
18 “The power by which particular things, and consequently a man, preserve their being is the 
power of God, i.e., of Nature; not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by 
actual human essence. So, the power of a man in so far as it is explained through his actual essence, 
is a part of the infinite power, that is, of the essence, of God, i.e., of Nature” (IV, P4.) He then 
continues with the interesting statements “The power of God is his essence” (I, P34) and “Nothing 
exists from whose nature some effect does not follow” (I, P36), followed by the Demonstration 
“Whatever exists expresses the nature, i.e., the essence, of God in a certain and determinate way. 
That is, whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the 
cause of all things, and so some effect must follow from it.”   
19 Note here the following sequence: “The endeavor by which each thing endeavors to persevere 
in its being is nothing other than the actual essence of the thing (III, P7,) and, as an appetite, is 
nothing other than the very essence of man, from the the nature of which there necessarily follow 
those things that contribute to his preservation (see III, P9Sc.) There is no difference between 
appetite and desire, except that desire is usually related to men in so far as they are conscious of 
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their appetite (ibid.). If the essence of reason is nought else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and 
distinctly understands (IV, P26Dem, and see II, P40Sc2); therefore whatsoever we endeavour in 
obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand. “Nor shall we endeavour to understand 
things for the sake of any end. On the contrary, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will be able to 
conceive as good for itself only that which leads to understanding” (IV, P26Dem.) 
20 Peirce writes that we do not know the “vast ocean of unforeseen consequences which the 
acceptance of the word is destined to bring about, not merely consequences of knowing but perhaps 
revolutions of society. One cannot tell what power there may be in a word or a phrase to change 
the face of the world” (my emphasis. CP 8.186). On energy, see the already quoted James 1910. 
21 There are some scattered quotes about Spinoza in Peirce’s earlier works. In 1863 (W1:103) and 
1883-4 (W5:493), in a proposed list of the 300 Great Men, but actually they are not very relevant. 
On these themes see Anderson 1997. 
22 For a very similar interpretation see Guardiano 2017. 
23 I first read this quotation in Zalamea 2017: 419n16, whom I thank for bringing it to my attention. 
Further on in the review it becomes clear that Peirce was familiar with all the English editions of 
the Ethics, that he knew the Short Treatise too, and that he was capable of drawing various 
connections between Spinoza and previous thinkers, including Bruno and Hobbes. 
24 In n. 8 I referred to a nearly literal passage from Pragmatism (1907). Belief is “That upon which 
a man is prepared to act”. Also significant is the following quotation: “judgment, [...] the sole 
vehicle in which a concept can be conveyed to a person’s cognizance or acquaintance, is not a 
purely representitious event, but involves an act, an exertion of energy, and is liable to real 
consequences, or effects” (CP 5.547). 
25 To my knowledge, Shannon Dea is the only one to have noticed this important link: see Dea 
2014. Yet, in a more semiotic perspective, see Vinciguerra 2005. 
26 Repeated in What Pragmatism is, 1905, CP 5.412, in Pragmatism, 1906, CP 5.11, and in 
Pragmatism, 1907, EP2:399: “Socrates bathed in these waters. Aristotle rejoices when he can find 
them. They run, where least one would suspect them, beneath the dry rubbish-heaps of Spinoza.” 
Here Peirce seems scornful. However, as we have seen, a very different opinion emerges from his 
reviews (it would be interesting, in this regard, to have philologically and chronologically correct 
editions of relevant manuscripts from the last twenty years of the author’s life.) 
27 I thank Mats Bergman for bringing this quotation to my attention. 
